Abstract
The enduring appeal of significant results
58
The words 'significant' or 'significantly' appear in the abstract or title of over 400,000 articles 59 listed in the Web of Science Core Collection for the year 2016, amounting to 18% of all 60 records for that year. Usage has risen 3.8-fold since 1996, outstripping a 2.5-fold rise in the 61 annual production of all articles. In environmental sciences and ecology, usage has risen 4.2-62 fold over the same period compared to a 3.0-fold rise in annual production. The words appear 63 in over 19,000 environmental and ecology articles published in 2016, amounting to 27% of all 64 records in the discipline and more than in any other research area except Oncology. 65
These trends belie a renaissance over the last 20 years in Bayesian analysis and 66 information-theoretic modelling that de-emphasizes statistical significance. The articles that 67 cite significant entities include several of the most influential of all research outputs, with the 68 top ten having Impact Factors exceeding 400 (citations within 24 months of publication). The 69 reports of main findings nevertheless involve ambiguous claims in all cases except a minority 70 that make reference to clearly non-statistical significance (e.g., "significant advances in the 71 field" -see Box 1). To appreciate the reason why this is such a universal problem requires a 72 close inspection of the meaning of statistical significance. 73
[Box 1 here] 74
Statistical significance explains the population not the data 75 A refutable null hypothesis H0 and its test alternative H1 always make propositions about 76 pattern in a population of interest, from which the study takes data samples for analysis. The 77 hypotheses concern a specified explanation of the domain of inference set by the population, 78 not the significance of an effect on the samples that represent it. When using frequentist 79 5 statistics, each P value describes the probability of data at least as deviant given H0, and thus 80 the probability of making an error by rejecting H0. The inference it permits therefore concerns 81 an explanation of the population, not a description of the data sampled from it. An example 82 will illustrate this distinction and its consequences. 83
Consider a field experimental test for the effectiveness of a pesticide treatment on crop 84 yield. Replicate independent plots, representatively sampling a population of crop plants of 85 interest, were randomly assigned to a low or a high dosage of the pesticide, or to a water 86 control. The study authors might correctly report a one-way analysis of variance with Helmert 87 contrasts as: "Crop yield depended on treatment (F2,33 = 4.39, P = 0.02), with no evidence of a 88 difference between low and high dosages of pesticide (pesticide vs control contrast: t33 = 2.92, 89 P = 0.006; low vs high dosage contrast: t33 = 0.51, P = 0.61)." 90
To claim that "crop yield depended significantly on treatment" would misinterpret P, 91 which finds the data incompatible with the null hypothesis, as a description of the data, which 92 finds different sample means. The analysis never tests for, let alone finds, a significant 93 difference between sample means. The correct inference, that "yield depended on treatment" 94 within the population of interest, is evidenced by the low probability of a false positive "(F2,33 95 = 4.39, P = 0.02)" using valid assumptions about the design of sampling from the population. 96
Having established the presence of a treatment effect, a description or illustration of its size 97 can inform the biological significance of the effect within the domain of inference (set by the 98 population) and thus the interpretation of the test. 99
To claim that "there was no significant difference between the dosages (low vs high 100 dosage contrast: t33 = 0.51, P = 0.61)" would mislead, in implying that they differed albeit not 101 significantly. Worse yet, it would be wrong, because the P value relates to a hypothesized 102 absence of difference in the population, not in samples from the population. One can draw a 103 subtly different inference, however, that "low and high dosages did not differ detectably in 104 6 their effect on yield." This statement reports an explanation as far as we can ascertain it from 105 the test. Now also it becomes clear that we would want to have calculated a priori the power 106 of the design to detect an effect of biologically relevant size, to provide the reader with a level 107 of confidence in the apparent equality. Indeed, regardless of the significance of an effect, we 108 would do well to evaluate it against an a priori size threshold (see Box 2). 109
[Box 2 here] 110
Expunging the word solves the problem Removing the reference to significance removes the opportunity to fit the data to an 136 explanation, by coercing the statement into a conventional report on the detection of effects in 137 alternative models fitted to data. 138 and the assumption of normality. It thus appears to provide more information than the P value 151 for a specified H0, because it encompasses all plausible H0. We should exercise great care, 152 however, in using the CI for post hoc rejection of alternative H0. This is because the power of 153 a hypothesis-testing study is quantified with respect to an effect size of relevance to the test 154 8 hypothesis which itself pertains to the refutable null hypothesis. Each H0 therefore demands a 155 separate power calculation. In consequence, the CI generally provides no more useful 156 information than that given by the P value, because it derives from the same data and 157 assumptions (Murtaugh, 2014; van Helden, 2016). As a visual representation of the 158 significance test, moreover, it conceals the pattern of data distribution, which will underpin 159 the assumptions of the test. Although it illustrates the margin of error around the effect size 160 estimate (Halsey et al., 2016), it requires the same interpretation as the P value with respect to 161 the power of the study to detect an effect of relevant size (see Box 2). The following example 162 will illustrate this point. 163
Confidence intervals alone tell an unreliable story
Consider three alternative sampling strategies for measuring change in crop yield due to 164 a pesticide application (figure 2). Study A obtains an average gain in yield of 41.0 kg/ha 165 across a sample of 10 fields. Its 95% CI does not include H0: μ = 0. It thus finds that a 166 population with a normal distribution of equally variable gains around μ = 0 will yield sample 167 means at least as deviant as the observed one in less than 5% of equally-replicated samples. In 168 contrast, μ = 10 or 70 kg/ha, both lying within the CI, will yield sample means at least as 169 deviant in more than 5% of samples. Study A can report a detectable change in yield 170 (rejection of H0: = 0, t 9 = 2.758, P = 0.022). An alternative study B, however, with twice the 171 replication and consequently a smaller CI, obtains a lower sample mean from the same 172 population and fails to reject the null hypothesis of no change (t19 = 1.331, P = 0.199, figure  173 2). Does this more powerful study provide a more robust explanation? We can't tell without 174 evaluating outcomes against an effect size of relevance to the test hypothesis. 175
Small-sample studies have little reliability in testing for small effects. Suppose the 176 breakeven gain in yield for a cost-effective pesticide is δ = 10 kg/ha, in a population of fields 177 with a standard deviation of σ = 45 kg/ha (consistent with the observed variability around 178 sample means). We would therefore wish to detect a positive effect for any true standardized 179 Small-sample studies can have useful predictive power, if they test for the presence of 209 large effects. For example, study A has 90% power to detect a positive effect given a true 210 standardized effect δ/σ = 1.0, and study B has 90% power given δ/σ = 0.67. Suppose that the 211 breakeven gain for the pesticide is δ = 45 kg/ha for σ = 45 kg/ha. Then study A has 90% 212 power to detect a yield increase given δ = 45, or in the other direction it has 90% power to 213 detect a less-than cost-effective increase given δ = 0. Study B likewise has >90% power to 214 detect these categories of effect size. From the CI of study A we conclude that yield changes 215 (rejection of H0: = 0, P < 0.05), but the estimated amount is less than cost-effective. From 216 the CI of study B we conclude that if there is any yield change, it is less than cost effective 217 (rejection of H0: = 45, P < 0.05). These conclusions reflect the reality that the datasets for 218 figure 2 were generated in R by random sampling from a normal distribution with specified 219 parameters  σ = 26  45 kg/ha (δ/σ = 0.58). 220
Computer-generated data allow us the privilege of repeating each study multiple times, 221 to play out the advantages of study replication predicted by the statistics (figure 3). In 222 accordance with the threshold α = 0.05 for significance, all three designs reject the true = 26 223 in ~5% of repeats, showing in figure 3 by ~5 bars in each study being ether red lying above 224 = 26 or blue lying below it. Design C nevertheless produces vastly more consistent estimates 225 than designs A and B. Design A fails to reject a null hypothesis of no effect in ~63% of 226 repeats (~63 of its red bars lying below = 0), reflecting its 37% power to detect an effect at 227 the true δ/σ = 0.58. If we meta-analyzed 17 studies of design A, however, we would match the 228 replication of one study C, and therefore also its power (Borenstein et They can distinguish the more parsimonious of alternative models, but all candidate models 250 will have poor explanatory precision and descriptive accuracy in an underpowered design. 251
Concluding remarks

252
In seeking to generalize from individual samples, the scientific pursuit of knowledge opposes 253 the artistic quest for significant examples of universal truths (Kundera, 1986). Scientists take 254 artistic license by making claims for significant pattern in their samples. They can easily 255 excise the suspicion of fitting their data to a desired model by refraining from any reference to 256 the significance of the data when reporting statistical analyses. A greater difficulty arises in 257 evaluating the precision of significance tests and the accuracy of effect-size estimates, which 258 are done with respect to an effect size of biological relevance. Studies frequently lack such 259 prior knowledge, in which case authors can still usefully report the size of true effect for 260 which the study has 90% power to detect its presence. Or why not instead give Bayesian 261 statistics a try? The Bayesian requirement for a prior probability distribution often deters 262 13 researchers, and yet it is no more arduous than the frequentist requirement for a standardized 263 Effect size: The size of treatment effect on a response (e.g., a difference between means or a 370 regression slope), sometimes standardized against error variation. Effect size is estimated 371 from data independently of significance, and is only sensible to report for a detectable effect. 372
Hypothesis: A proposition about a population of interest. A test hypothesis, H1, is a 373 proposition of biologically informative pattern; it is calibrated against a refutable null 374 hypothesis, H0, of no such pattern. Hypothesis-testing distinguishes alternative explanations 375 of the population, and can be applied to predicting future trends. 376
Model: A statistical model defines the test and null hypotheses in the form of an equation. 377
The model is tested against data in order to find the best fitting structure, always with respect 378 to its underpinning assumptions. For example, a test hypothesis of biodiversity varying with 379 forest age could take the additive model: Biodiversity = Age + , with variation due to Age 380 calibrated against error variation . The refutable null hypothesis is: biodiversity = . 381
Population:
The entire set of measurable units encompassed by a test hypothesis (e.g., avian 382 biodiversity across all tropical secondary forests in Central America). Study design requires a 383 clear definition of the population, in order to sample representatively from it. The population 384 then defines the scope of inference of the study. Hypothesis-testing statistics are run on 385 samples from a population, not on observations of the entire population. 386
Power: The probability of a given sampling strategy detecting an effect if it is present in the 387 sampled population at a specified size. Statistical power = 1 -β, where β is the probability of 388 making a Type-II error: failure to reject a false null hypothesis, given a true standardized 389 effect size, sampling strategy, test statistic and threshold α of Type-I error. Power analysis 390 provides the means to design studies for precise detection of effects and accurate estimation 391 of their sizes. 392 P value: The proportion calculated by a frequentist statistic equal to the probability of data at 393 least as deviant as the observed set, given the null hypothesis H0, and thus the probability of 394 making an error by rejecting H0. The reliability of the P value depends on the power of the 395 study to detect an effect of specified size. 396
Replication: The number of independent observations randomly sampled from a population 397 of interest that together provide evidence for pattern in the population. No statistics are 398 possible without replication within samples. Small samples will have low power to detect all 399 but large effects. In field studies, large samples may risk violating the assumption of 400 independent observations due to spatial autocorrelation. 401
Significance: (i) The statistical probability of falsely rejecting a null hypothesis (the 'P 402 value'), in relation to the upper threshold  of acceptable probability in making this Type-I 403 error (often set at 0.05). The relative size of P informs an explanation of the population in 404 Box 1. Did you really mean that? 
